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cATASTROPHE, CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY:THE DEATH, DECAY AND REBIRTH OF
TOWNS FROM ANTIQUITY TO TODAY
John Bintliff
My interest in 'urban catastrophe' has been stimulated by a puzzling observation
from my field project in Boeotia, Central Greece. The city of Haliartos was destroyed
by the Roman army in 171 BC (Bintliff and Snodgrass 1988a). Curiously, both the
town and its countryside remained thinly populated till Medieval times, when a
new small town emerged; when this was abandoned in the 17th century AD, a
further 250 years elapsed before refoundation. In contrast the regional centre, the
large city of Thebes, despite wholesale destruction by Alexander, was refounded
by Cassander within a few years, and within a few generations was extensive and
prosperous again (Symeonoglou 1985), remaining the focus for Eastern Boeotia till
the present day. Why, we might ask ourselves, do catastrophes have such divergent
outcomes for the development of towns?
Turning to natural catastrophes, the same paradox appears: it remains remarkable
that the violent earthquakes which threw down the Old Palaces of Minoan Crete
(Fig. 1) led merely to their rapid rebuilding on an even grander scale (Cadogan
1976; Myers, Myers and Cadogan 1992) - the New Palaces - by a society that
had all the characteristics of its predecessor.
It seems that a catastrophe is unambiguous in the short term, measured by loss of
life and property; in the long term, however, quite divergent consequences emerge,
revealing a spectrum from continuing disastrous effects, via minor transformations
of society, to a total absence of long-term effects.
I have recently been greatly stimulated by the implications for the social sciences
of a package of theory enjoying widespread and interdisciplinary application in the
Natural Sciences - Chaos and Complexity Theory (Lewin 1993; Reed and Harvey
1992). In the world of Physics, Chemistry and Biology, there are endless phenomena
where the building-blocks of the natural world can behave rather randomly - Chaos.
Yet everywhere in Nature, we see these components interacting systematically to
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form Complexity: the mutating genes that lie in all our body cells, for example, or the
individual animals in an ecosystem.
Although panta rei - the natural world is constantly changing and evolving, is his-
torical, these variable components are constantly being drawn, as if magnetically,
into familiar or new complex structures. Mathematicians, who have inspired this
interdisciplinary body of theory, call these structures 'Attractors''. A single structure
which draws in or attracts the behaviour of many components gives them a circular
or doughnut-shaped path over time (Fig. 2). However, as both structure and com-
ponents are always evolving semi-independently, a critical point can be reached
in the parameters of the complex entity, where the system faces several outcomes -
called a Bifurcation (Fig. 3). The system may be pushed towards one path and retain
order, or take several and move towards fragmentation and ultimately chaos. The
path to two parallel forms creates a dual or 'butterfly' attractor. It is considered
that the reason why components are drawn into Attractors, thereby losing their
independence at least temporarily to be part of a complex structure, is due to
strong positive feedback where co-operation is mutually advantageous.
The mathematics show that the nath nf a™, „ i τ
.. , Patn ot any complex system at a bifurcation is
heavily dependent on Initial CondiHnns· n-Hn^r- ^κ · ι ,^.ununwns: minor changes in the variables comprising
a structure can lead it into rapid collapse, sustained complexity, or even a new
level of complexity CompleXlty Theory also teaches that the more elaborate such
structures are, the closer to Chaos or risk of breakdown
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Figure 2. 'Folding phase space'. The tope/logical folding of previously separate trajectories into
one creates an attractor, known as Birkhoff's bagel (after ]. Gleich, Chaos. Making a New
Science, 1987:254).
One final piece of theory: Fractals (Fig. 4). There are Attractors in the Natural
World that operate in an identical way at a series of spatial scales - producing similar
structures from the microscopic to the gigantic. These are called fractal patterns
(here is the famous example of a simple branching pattern, which magnified to a
series of nested spatial scales, mimics patterns of real-world organic growth such
as a fern).
Perhaps quite enough of typical Anglo-Saxon theory jargon (even if mostly
derived from the Continent!): does it help us understand human societies? In the
study of settlement history I believe it does. It has long been recognised that certain
attractors exercise a powerful influence on the size, function and spacing of villages,
towns and cities in agricultural societies (Brush 1953; Tidswell 1978) (Table 1).
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Figure 3. An early bifurcation diagram based on innumerable répétitive computations of a logis-
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a strong tendency for hamlet-village networks to develop at distances of 5-10 km
interval; for district towns to develop at around 30 km interval. Settlement size
(Berry 1967; Tidswell 1978) (Fig. 5), divides towns and villages at around 2000
people. (Incidentally these generalisations have a high resonance with the work
on ancient Greek towns carried out by Eberhard Ruschenbusch (Ruschenbusch
1985) and Bruno Helly and his colleagues at Lyon (Auda, Darmezin, Decourt,
Helly and Lucas 1991), and with Ernst Kirsten's Dorfstaat model (Kirsten 1956),
these connections being further explored in a recently published paper (Bintliff
1994)). There are ergonomie and sociobiological factors at work in these attractors,
that I have discussed in full detail elsewhere (Bintliff, in press).
At this point it is important to emphasise the problems archaeology and historical
geography experience in a period of continual shift of theoretical mini-paradigms
such as we have seen since the late 1950s to the present day. The remarkable
regularities in settlement patterning revealed through the Quantitative Revolution
and Locational Analysis approaches of the New Geography have been replaced
by a Culturabst emphasis growing out of Postmodernism, in which individual per-
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Figure 4. A computer iteration of a fractal pattern which produces a simulacrum of natural
growth, such as in a fern (courtesy of David Byrne).
ceptions of Space and Place have become the centre of attention. The significant
observations about settlement location, concentric land use regimes, the size and
shape of exploitation and marketing territories, the size and distance of different
categories of settlement - raised in the 1950s-1970s - have been consigned to
dusty oblivion as irrelevant to Culturalism. Not that these empirical observations
were ever shown to be fallacious, merely that the questions they raised were incom-
patible with the Postmodern agenda. The fact that the everyday major research pro-
grammes of historical regional geography and regional field archaeology provide
new and very fine data demanding attention to exactly these questions has had
no impact on the current temporary romance with Culturalism and Idealist
approaches in general, which have had nothing to say about these observations.
Table 1. The hierarchy of settlements in mid-20th century Wisconsin. After Tidswell, 1978,










































Figure 5. Scatter diagram to show variations in levels of the settlement hierarchy. After Tidswell
1978, Figure 11.1, derived from 'Berry 1967.
I do not challenge the importance and interest of Postmodern and Culturalist
perspectives on the landscape and the townscape, but they present in this fashion
a very partial viewpoint that has turned its back thoughtlessly on the complexity
of historical processes - what the Annaliste historians call 'Total History'. There is
not least in Spatial Archaeology a definite 'Poverty of Theory', and I feel pleased
consciously to bring to the reader's attention neglected data, ideas and possibilities
from the viewpoint of human ecology, economic history and quantitative geography
(cf. Bintliff 1993, 1995).
What we have seen with rural settlements is likewise true with urban settlements.
Townscapes show strong cross-cultural tendencies wherever organic growth domi-
nates over centra] planning in their layout, towards a certain kind of spatial differ-
entiation (Meyer and Huggett 1981) (Fig. 6), first analysed by the Chicago School
of'urban geography. In ancient terms the 'Central Business District' is the Agora
DEATH, DECAY AND REBIRTH OF TOWNS FROM ANTIQUITY TO TODAY 73
Hoyt's sectoral model of urban structure
1 Central business district




Figure 6. Model developed in the 1930s by Hoyt to describe the urban structure of modern cities.
After Meyer and Huggett 1981, Fig. 3.15.
or Forum. I wish deliberately to introduce a practical example of an industrial city
close to my university town of Durham - Sunderland (Meyer and Huggett 1981;
Robson 1969) (Fig. 7), as it looked in the 1960s when an urban geographic analysis
was carried out on its plan. I shall return to Sunderland later. We must merely note
here that such spatially-complex town plans are cases of a single dominant attractor,
where the life of all the separate classes and residential areas of the town is focused
on a few dominant economic activities, integrated politically, socially and economic-
ally through the Central Business District (Forum/Agora).
Let me now introduce some archaeological urban catastrophes. My first group of
examples belong to the Early Bronze Age in the Levant and Mesopotamia. In a
sophisticated series of studies, Tony Wilkinson has used his many years of fieldwork
amongst the Early Bronze Age urban foci of North Mesopotamia to create a devel-
opmental model (Wilkinson 1994). Large villages emerge (with satellite hamlets),
due to familiar attractors at 10 km distance from each other. Later, towns grow
organically out of this network, at a familiar, c. 30 km radius from each other. In
Complexity Theory such a convergent development from repetitive circumstances
is termed 'self-organisation'. The Central Place (Fig. 8) grows through controlling
the surplus of its villages; they also grow due to the stimulus to intensify land use
to feed the city. In a semi-arid, dry-farmed environment with recurrent rainfall fluc-
tuations, this complex urban landscape is 'near the edge of Chaos'. Wilkinson calcu-
lates (Fig. 9) the growing imbalance of population versus resources, and the
reduction of buffering mechanisms against crop fluctuations. He reveals the precar-
iousness of urban life under Bronze Age technological constraints (as shown by the
risk of total resource failure for the urban system under poor yield years on these
graphs).
In the late 3rd millennium BC, this North Mesopotamian urban system did indeed
collapse like a house of cards - to be followed by a settlement pattern of a reduced
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Figure 7. Urban analysis of Sunderland by B.T, Robson, 1969 After Meyer and Huggett 1981,
Fig. 3.16.
number of villages. Harvey Weiss and a team of earth scientists have recently (Weiss
1993) claimed that c. 2300 BQ when this occurred, the crop failures predicted by
Wilkinson's model under 'normal' good year-bad year runs were made unusually
severe due to a drastic climatic fluctuation.
Also of Early Bronze Age date is the precocious Jordanian urban site of Jawa
(Helms 1981) (but see Philip 1995, for caution over Helms' scenarios for this remark-
able site). Constructed in the pre-desert in an area of inadequate local rainfall for
such a large settlement, it grew rapidly on the basis of elaborate water diversion
and retention systems for torrential rains falling on higher ground to the north-
west. Whether the rapid collapse of town life was due to internal social divisions
or the inability to maintain the engineering system is unclear, but it seems likely
that the 'complexity' of the town in such a situation was a high-risk ecological
and social development unlikely to be sustained.
Arlene Rosen's study of Early Bronze Age urban sites in Palestine (Rosen 1995),
especially Tell Erani, provides a similar story. A network of small defended towns
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15km
Modular catchments illustrating the transformation from seven individual
terr i tor ies each of 5km radius (top) to a compound catchment
incorporating the seven individual catchments (bottom). Because the
lowest-order satellites may be temporary features of the landscape, they
have been omitted from the lower diagram. Modified circles have been
used to facilitate packing: production figures used in the text have been
calculated from circular catchments. Shaded area, pasture.
Figure 8. Wilkinson's model far the evolution of district central-places in Early Bronze Age
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Surplus and deficit production (in persons supported per hectare) at different levels
of yield generated by (top left) Tell al-Hawa, (bottom left) its secondary settlements,
and (right) the settlement system as a whole at various population densities (white
bars, 100/ha; shaded bars, 150/ha; solid bars, 200/ha).
Figure 9. Sustainability of district central-place systems in Early Bronze Age North Mesopo-
tamia according to differing population levels and cereal production levels. After Wilkinson
1994, Fig. 13.
emerges in Early Bronze II. Good environmental evidence from several approaches
(Fig. 10) shows that climate had been growing drier since a moist era in the preced-
ing Copper Age. At Rosen's case-study site of Tell Erani a vital part of the town's
crop production derived from a recent alluvial plain, created during that wetter
climate era. However during the late 3rd millennium BC there is widespread evi-
dence for a further stage in the desiccation of climate in Palestine, associated with
the' removal of the alluvial plain by stream downcutting. Failure to compensate
led to the collapse of town life at Erani.







Lake deposits during the past 10,000years
in the south basin of the Dead Sea
(after Neev and Emery 1967)
Figure 10. Evidence for short-lived climatic fluctuations in the Copper Age-Early Bronze Age of
the Levant. After Rosen 1995, Fig. 2, derived from Neev and Emery 7967.
The parallels to events elsewhere in 3rd millennium urban sites are clear. But Rosen
sees this as a social and intellectual, rather than simply ecological, catastrophe.
Despite the availability to Early Bronze Age communities of agricultural advantages
unavailable to Chalcolithic predecessors (such as olives, vines, the plough), they
failed to adapt to localised environmental deterioration.
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In summary, Early Bronze Age urbanism in the Middle East appears to be com-
plexity with inherent instability.
Let me now turn to another 'natural catastrophe': Plague Epidemics. We are all
familiar with the awesome effects of the 14th century AD Black Death. It left its
mark in terms of a population collapse - (Fig. 11), from Morris (1989, Fig. 89)
after Hatcher - from which recovery took several centuries, a significant contribution
to the decline of Feudalism, and the conversion to pastoralism of marginal zones.
Yet the recurrence of a high-mortality Bubonic Plague in 17th century AD Europe -
(Fig. 12) from Schofield (1989, Fig. 8.7), after Wrigley - had a very different set of
consequences. Especially for England and France there were minimal effects on
socio-economic life. The current specialist view on this contrast, particularly in the
Cambridge Group for the History of Human Populations, is in accordance with our
models, that differing initial conditions are critical to the path of human societal
development (Campbell 1993; Walter and Schofield 1989).
By the 14th century much of Europe was overpopulated, overcultivated and in-
efficiently farmed, usually in the context of a feudal economy which inhibited agri-
cultural development; communications were poor between regions; and state action
in health was rudimentary. The dramatic collapse of population, in the West of
Europe at least, allowed a reorganisation of the countryside towards regional
specialisation of production; with poor communications this meant low populations
in pastoral areas and abandonment of the most marginal lands. Population recovery
was therefore slow.
1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
Figure 11. Long-term flows in English Medieval population, with rangt between plausible
limits. After Morris 1989, Fig, 89, derived from Hatcher 1977.
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Figure 12. Population growth in Western Europe. After Schofield 1989, Fig.8.7, derived from
Wrigley T 986.
By the 17th century, however, state bureaucracy was more efficient in containing
plague attacks. Regional specialisation in food production was now combined
with improved communications to create a national food exchange, so that famines
became rare and crop failures were met through the flow of complementary food
types between regions.
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The conclusion of current studies of Bubonic Plague epidemics is that long-term
effects are more indicative of the varying socio-economic structure of afflicted areas,
than of the potential of the disease to influence history at that scale.
My final example for urban catastrophe follows on from this discussion, as it
concerns the effect of the famous Bubonic Plague of the 6th century AD in the
Mediterranean.
In the decades before the 540s, the Byzantine Empire under Justinian reached, in
its Eastern Provinces, a degree of populousness and wealth often unparalleled since
Classical Greek times (Bintliff and Snodgrass 1988b). The successful campaigns of
Justinian's generals looked set to restore to Roman power all the lost provinces of
the West Mediterranean and North Africa. Yet between the end of the 6th and
the middle of the 7th century in the Byzantine world, most urban sites had been
reduced to village status or abandoned, rural populations had collapsed, and the
provinces, too weak to resist, were flooded by Slav, Berber and, soon after, Arab
invaders. The incidence of Bubonic Plague, starting in the 540s but recurring till
the 8th century AD, is commonly given a major role in the 'catastrophic' decay of
the Early Byzantine Empire and its urban network.
I want to take us forward again to 20th century AD Sunderland, in North-East
England, to search for a deeper understanding of these phenomena. Recall to
mind that picture of the high-employment, organic, integrated and 'Fordist' city
of the 1960s - a classic single attractor city built on the interdependence of coal,
steel and shipbuilding. Today, however, in the 1990s, we find a very different city.
My colleague in the Sociology Department at Durham, David Byrne, has argued
(Byrne 1997) that in this, and other 'Post-Industrial' cities of northern and midland
Britain, the 'catastrophic' collapse of traditional heavy industries has pushed the
organic Fordist city into a bifurcation: now there are two city worlds in each town.
Those of you in Europe and North America will be familiar with this divergence of
urban life in the Post-Industrial city (Harvey 1989): the prosperous, downtown con-
sumer shopping malls with their Postmodern architecture and wealthy patrons, and
the ghettoes of unemployment, crime and decaying buildings where riots are latent.
Byrne uses statistical analysis and Chaos Theory to reveal these two divergent
attractors, i.e a butterfly attractor model (Fig. 13). His first, Factor 1 population, is
high in unemployment, rented homes and often car-less. His Factor 2 population
is rich in employment, mainly home-owners and car-owners. Byrne also suggests
that global sociology indicates a fractal perspective to these observations in particu-
lar towns. In place of the 19th to early 20th century world of First, Second and Third
World economic belts, core-periphery areas of advantaged and disadvantaged socie-
ties spatially segregated by country and even continent, our Post-Fordist world of
Flexible Capital and Multinational companies operates through a dislocation into
advantaged and disadvantaged communities within every town and every country.
The dual society runs right across the world at all spatial scales.
Let us now take these insights back with us to focus on the Early Byzantine urban
decline. In the Early Roman Empire, a typical Greco-Roman town was a single
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Figure 13. Divergent population groups in contemporary 'Post-Industrial' Cleveland, NE Eng-
land (Hds = Households). Courtesy o/D. Byrne (cf. Byrne 1997 for a discussion of the study).
attractor in our terms (Figs 14 and 15(1)). Life focused on the political, commercial,
social and religious activities of the forum or agora, the 'core' around which lay the
different rich and poor housing sectors, all a 'periphery' which shared in the exploi-
tation of the town's agricultural and mineral hinterland and the possibilities of exter-
nal trade. The town lay (Fig. 16), modified after Leveau (1984) as the core of a
periphery of satellite settlements, mutually advantageous, and in a higher spatial
scale the town is part of a provincial core-periphery relation with Rome itself. The
town was thus also part of a fractal landscape at ascending spatial scales organised
along core-periphery lines of strong positive feedback promoting integration of
society.
Tim Potter has recently published an in-depth analysis of Early Byzantine period
urban development in the Mediterranean from the 4th to 7th centuries AD (Potter,
1995). In a careful study of excavations from Africa, Italy and the Eastern provinces,
Potter shows that, usually from the late 4th century AD, most town fora are going
out of use: slum housing spreads across the paving, burials and rubbish pits
appear, even agricultural soils. Tumbled columns are left fallen and can be used
as elements in primitive housing. The former, wide colonnaded streets are gradually
filled with unpretentious wooden stalls, churches and even agricultural installations.
At the same time, in stark contrast, in the 5th to 6th centuries AD, usually in a
different area of the town (Figs 14 and 15(2)), new buildings are being erected -
often impressively large - Christian basilicas and the mansions of the wealthy.
Here is a paradox. One school, usually historians, sees the Roman town as surviving
till the 7th century or even much later, since bishops are recorded, large churches,















Figure 14. Ρ/αη of Malis Maior in Tunisia. After Potter 1995, Fig. 33 and Mahjoubi.
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Figure 15. Model for the transformation of a fractal society in town and country between Early











Figure 14. Plan ofBelalis Maior in Tunisia. After Potter 2995, Fig. 33 and Mahjoubi.
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Figure 15. Model for the transformation of a fractal society in town and country between Early
and Late Roman times in the Mediterranean region.
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Figure 16. A characteristic urban hinterland in the Roman Empire. The service catchment of the
town of lol Caesarea (Cherchel, Algeria), largely circumscribed by an access radius of 15 km (see
Fig. 5). After Potter 1995, Fig. 4, derived from Leveau 1984.
school, usually archaeologists, points to the undeniable physical decay of the town,
and the dominance of slum construction, purposeful demolition and clumsy reuse of
classical architectural spolia.
Potter's conclusions are interesting:
• He sees no causation through the Vandal conquest or other military factors on
these Byzantine town developments: the decline of the imperial town was
already in progress
• Long-term economic and sociopolitical changes in the Roman Empire had
broken the will and the ability of most town councils or rich individuals to
invest in the urban infrastructure - apart from churches. Towns were increas-
ingly being managed by imperial officials (cf. Haldon 1990)
• Within the towns, however, the Christian church was taking advantage of the
vaccuum in local affairs to create its own power-base, often deliberately
'remote from the forum. Around the new focus was taking shape the work of
distributing food to the poor and a new hierarchy of patronage and economic
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control. Meanwhile in the traditional downtown zones and other remaining
inhabited areas of the town, an attractor of 'villagisation' is observable: people
poor in material culture or artistic pretension are returning to a basic level of sub-
sistence, and craft production of a less sophisticated kind. The Church, despite
its close links to the wealthy class, offers a one-way welfare bridge to the poor
sectors.
To this I would add from my own project database in Greece for this era the fol-
lowing suggestion: the beneficial core-periphery system of the town and its hinter-
land also seems to be breaking up. Surplus crop production was perhaps going
directly from the larger estates to the coast to feed Constantinople and other
great centres rather than to the nearest town, or being consumed on the estate by
populations that had left the town to seek the patronage of large landowners (cf.
Whittaker 1983).
The fractal view shifts accordingly (Fig. 15(2)). The fragmentation of the Early
Byzantine townscape into the dual city is reflected in the countryside, with the
decline of the dependent relation between town and hinterland. Likewise, one
part of the countryside remains closely tied in with the wider world (the rich
sector), the other (the rural peasantry) is becoming a dependent class with narrow
social and economic horizons. Might we not look for the same divergence of town
life in the city of Constantinople itself? Perhaps we do have evidence for this: in
532 AD the terrible Nika riots are reported to have left 30,000 dead and the
centre of Constantinople burnt to the ground. Cyril Mango (Mango, 1980) suggests
that urban decay in the provinces had also reached the capital.
What effect might the Great Plague of the 540s and its recurrence afterwards have
had on this longer process of urban decay, already in full progress throughout the
Late Roman-Early Byzantine world? (Fig. 17). After the first devastating impact of
the Plague, we see new urban bifurcations, a multiplicity of outcomes or a chaotic
development. At least three development paths emerge. For most provincial
towns, the loss of population at all social levels might have so reduced the role of
the town that a total villagisation may have occurred (perhaps some 116 of the esti-
mated 372 Roman towns in Italy may have disappeared: for example, Potter 1995).
In other towns, often for geopolitical reasons, the Church retained a base, allowing
the 'town' to continue officially even if its population was closer to a village (Luni
seems to be a good example). Only the largest towns would have continued to
attract sufficient population through administrative, military, and other considera-
tions to allow a truly urban role to persist (and even their size was dependent on
the sphere within which their 'command economies' could demand food from the
areas of their political control, as the great shrinkage of early Medieval Rome and
Constantinople testify, witness to the loss of their major grain provinces).
Yet, as historians of demography have repeatedly shown, plague of itself does not
create long-term population collapse. However, the breakdown of Early Byzantine
urban structure towards a more chaotic form was probably significantly hastened
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Figure 17. Population estimates for the Roman to Medieval Mediterranean, after Russell 1985,
Table 6.
by the Plague. At this time of weakness, also, the conquest of large areas of the
Byzantine countryside by Slav, Berber and later Arab settlers was made much
easier and further reinforced the urban disintegration process.
Once again, it is to these contemporary conditions that we can attribute the out-
come of the Plague rather than its own potential for culture-collapse. The decay of
town life, but not necessarily of urban population, began much earlier, and I wel-
come ideas as to how to account for this. Some provisional suggestions are put for-
ward in a concluding discussion to this paper. Also beyond the power of the Plague
is the great urban and rural depopulation of the late 6th and 7th centuries AD in the
former Roman and Early Byzantine Mediterranean, often not recovered from till the
llth to 12th centuries AD (Fig. 17). More plausible to account for the latter phenom-
enon is the role of endemic warfare and insecurity (Biraben 1989; Durliat 1989; for
comparison cf. the impact of the Thirty Years' War in Central Europe, German 1994),
factors which only began to disappear with the firm re-establishment of powerful
Christian Mediterranean states in the later 1st millennium AD.
In summary: I have argued that the variable consequences of natural and other
catastrophes for urban life are primarily a result of the variable nature of urban socie-
ties, rather than due to any inevitable effects of such disasters. This inference accords
excellently with the predictions of Chaos-Complexity Theory for the understanding
of that complex human organisation we call the City.
.It is worth underlining what Chaos-Complexity Theory adds to the already rich
literature in Archaeology devoted to Civilisational Collapse. Two very important
volumes come to mind - Joseph Tainter's analytical monograph The Collapse of
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Complex Societies (1988) and Norman Yoffee and George Cowgill's edited volume of
the same year, The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations. What I find in these
volumes is an excellent set of ideas and observations about the individual factors
that may be involved in societal collapse as well as in the preceding erection of com-
plex societies. What is missing - and this is surely merely a question of timing,
before the full impact of Chaos-Complexity had begun to spread outwards from
the Sciences - is that deeper suggestion that underpins this present paper: it is
not so much the specific elements of explanation that ought to be our central
focus, rather the nature and properties of complex systems in the physical, natural
and social world that give rise to repetitive kinds of morphologies of complex life
and morphologies of its disintegration. Moreover the essence of Chaos-Complexity
is the impossibility of prediction, the endless possibility of postdiction for societal
pathways. The specific models these books provide are going to be nonetheless a
vital part of the postdictive explanation of a particular collapse phenomenon or
emergence phenomenon. Yet we are now being asked for very pressing empirical
reasons, we are indeed being challenged, to muster human social patterns in order
to greet as familiar, similar forms of development and transformation in the bio-
logical or chemical world.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The investigation of structure-agency relations in comprehending the decay of
Classical Antiquity is an essential step which will benefit from the rich participant-
observer literature available to us from this era. Nonetheless, there is a central
proposition in Complexity Theory that reminds us that the mere summation of indi-
vidual motivation and action does not create society: the concept of 'emergent prop-
erties' argues that social and other elaborate structures are more than the sum of
their component parts. The Roman Empire was a structure of immense complexity
and surprising longevity; however, when complexity increases, Complexity Theory
argues that it is ever closer to the edge of Chaos. How then do we explain the extra-
ordinary persistence of that Empire? Many commentators have pointed to a poten-
tial causative link between the stabilisation of frontiers, cessation of expansion, and
internal decay, both for the Roman and other imperial systems (e.g. the Ottoman).
This interesting observation could be brought into relation with that school of
thought that sees ancient imperialism as a process of predator-prey expansion,
growth of the core being conditioned by expansion of the resource catchment sup-
porting the system (a view that Finley espoused, and modern scholars still find illu-
minating - such as Jeremy Paterson for Roman expansion, and Simon Hornblower
for Athenian expansion). In Complexity terms, the Roman Empire avoided 'chaos'
by always altering the rules of its structure through continual expansion, until stabil-
isation by the 3rd century AD; the observable decline of its oldest heartland, north-
central Italy, by this time, might be predictable on this approach, if the structure
became increasingly dependent on younger resource acquisitions. From the 3rd
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century AD the inner decay of the Empire would correlate with the inherent instabil-
ity of a very elaborate sociopolitical structure.
At the Durham interdepartmental Complexity Seminar, a parallel idea was raised
to account for the creation of the 'dual society' in Post-Industrial cities; this could
provide additional insight into the late Antique urban decline we have compared
it with. According to this hypothesis, in the expansion of the Capitalist economy
from its origins in Renaissance Western Europe, growth of the system was depen-
dent upon prédation on less-developed economies in spatially-distinct geographical
areas (Wallerstein's world-system model). With the achievement of global capital-
ism and the removal of the colonial structures which favoured the core First
World areas, the world economy has become unstable and prone to chaotic eco-
nomic behaviour, as a result of the variability of the more-autonomous producing
and consuming units across the world. Capitalism has gravitated towards a new
attractor - Flexible Accumulation (Harvey 1989) - which re-networks those with
capital away from traditional sociopolitical structures (the city, region, state, conti-
nent) with the aim of protecting wealth from such local to general economic fluctua-
tions. Whittaker's (1983) study of the very wealthy in Late Roman society would
seem to echo this scenario. The impact on urban and social coherence would
seem in good part accounted for in both late Antique and Post-Industrial situations.
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ABSTRACTS
Catastrophe, chaos and complexity: the death, decay and rebirth of towns from antiquity to
today
This article will investigate the phenomenon of urban decay and collapse, primarily using examples
from the ancient Mediterranean world, but also through comparison with David Byrne's recent
investigation of contemporary urban breakdown phenomena in northern England. The analytical
approach I wish to introduce to shed new light on this phenomenon is Chaos-Complexity
Theory, which has a growing attraction for many social scientists in its potential for resolving the
oppositional stances of Modernism and Postmodernism.
Catastrophe, chaos et complexité: mort, décadence et renaissance des villes de l'Antiquité à
nos jours
Cet article examine le phénomène de décadence et de déclin urbain, en utilisant des exemples prin-
cipalement issus du monde méditerranéen antique, ainsi qu'en établissant une comparaison avec les
travaux récents de David Byrnes sur le phénomène contemporain de dégénérescence urbaine dans
le nord de l'Angleterre. L'approche analytique que j'aimerais adopter afin de considérer ce phénom-
ène sous un jour nouveau, est celle de la théorie "Chaos-Complexité", théorie qui est de plus en
plus plébiscitée par de nombreux experts en sciences sociales à cause de son potentiel pour résoudre
les positions opposées du Modernisme et du Post-Modernisme.
Katastrophe, Chaos und Komplexität: Tod, Verfall und Wiedergeburt von Städten - vom
Altertum bis zur Gegenwart
Vor allem anhand von Beispielen aus dem antiken Mittelmeerraum, aber auch durch einen Ver-
gleich mit David Byrnes neuer Untersuchung des gegenwärtigen Zusammenbruchs von Städten
in Nordengland, untersucht dieser Beitrag das Phänomen des Zerfalls und Kollapses von Städten.
Der von mir gewählte analytische Ansatz, mit dem ich hoffe, dieses Phänomen in eine neues
Licht stellen zu können, ist Chaos-Komplexitätstheorie. Diese Theorie übt wegen ihres Potentials,
die gegensätzlichen Standpunkte von Modernismus und Postmodernismus aufzulösen, eine
zunehmende Anziehungskraft auf viele Sozialwissenschaftler(inn)en aus.
